Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

Shirley Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lynn C. Harris; Spence, Moriarity & Schuster; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant .
M. Dayle Jeffs; Jeffs & Jeffs; Robert L. Moody; Taylor, Moody & Thorne; John M Chipman; Clifford
J. Payne; Hanson, Nelson, Chipman, & Quigley; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, No. 940550 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6186

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT J J A r r
w

1^*-%**-—

BRIEF

UTAH
DOCUKv..:
KFU
50
—

FILED
MAR 2 3 1995

etc

( ^ ^ ^ % § J B E - y ¥ A H COURT OF APPEALS QQURT OF

POCKET HO
SHIRLEY CARRIER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM
ROGER SMITH, AND PLEASANT
GROVE CITY,
Defendants and Appellees.

APPEALS

;
])

Case No. 940550-CA

])

Priority No. 15

]
;
;
;
)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH
COUNTY
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING
LYNN C. HARRIS (#1382)
SPENCE, MORIARTTY & SCHUSTER
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
JOHN M. CHIPMAN (#628)
HANSON, NELSON, & CHIPMAN
136 So. Main Street, Ste. 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pleasant Grove City
M. DAYLE JEFFS (#1655)
JEFFS AND JEFFS
90 North 100 East / P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pro-Tech Restoration
ROBERT L. MOODY (#2302)
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
2525 N. Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee William Roger Smith

FILED
MAR 2 3 1995

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SHIRLEY CARRIER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 940550-CA
Priority No. 15

PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM
ROGER SMITH, AND PLEASANT
GROVE CITY,
Defendants and Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH
COUNTY
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING
LYNN C. HARRIS (#1382)
SPENCE, MORIARJTY & SCHUSTER
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
JOHN M. CHIPMAN (#628)
HANSON, NELSON, & CHIPMAN
136 So. Main Street, Ste. 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pleasant Grove City
M. DAYLE JEFFS (#1655)
JEFFS AND JEFFS
90 North 100 East / P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Pro-Tech Restoration
ROBERT L. MOODY (#2302)
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
2525 N. Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee William Roger Smith

TABLE OF CONTENTS

POINT 1:

POINT 2:

MS. CARRIER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS PROPERLY
PROPERLY REFLECTS THE FACTS PRESENTED
AT TRIAL AND CONTAINED IN THE
TRANSCRIPT

1

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS REVIEWS
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
RULE 47 AND SUTTON USING THE
"CORRECTNESS" STANDARD

3

A.

POINT 3:

The trial court's decision was an
interpretation of law

3

B.

The trial court had limited discretion

4

C

The trial court failed to give a factual
basis for its decision

7

DEFENDANTS FAIL TO MEET THE STANDARD
AS DEFINED IN RANDLE V. ALLEN REQUIRING
AN INDEPENDENT CROSS-CLAIM
A.

B.

C

D.

POINT 4:

8

Randle considered factors other than
independent cross-claims but found
them inadequate

8

The Randle decision requiring nonderivative cross-claims strengthens
and clarifies Sutton v. Otis

9

Randle's requirement of nonderivative
cross-claims strikes the best balance

10

Rule 47(c) and Randle's
interpretations
do not violate any constitutional
provisions

12

DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ESTABLISH A
SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN
THEM

i

14

POINT 5:
POINT 6:

MS. CARRIER NEED NOT SHOW ACTUAL
PREJUDICE

16

THE JURY'S VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

17

A.
B.

POINT 7:
POINT 8:

Ms. Carrier correctly marshaled the
relevant evidence

18

The clear weight of the evidence
contradicting the jury's verdict
is not based on assumptions

20

MS. CARRIER PROPERLY PRESENTED THE
RIGHT OF WAY ISSUE

21

THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWED DEFENDANTS
TO MAKE IMPROPER USE OF A REBUTTAL
WITNESS

22

CONCLUSION

25

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282
(Utah 1993)

8

Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990)

4

Blade v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317 (Colo. 1985)
Davidson

17

v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225

(Utah App. 1991)

22

Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981)
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816
(Utah 1992)
International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Smith, 269
S.W. 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)
King v. Special Resource Management, Inc., 256
Mont. 367, 846 P.2d 1038 (1993)
Nebbia y. People of State of New York, N.Y., 291
U.S. 502(1934)

8

12
11
16

13

Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d
447 (Utah 1993)

21

People v. Brooks, 621 N.Y.S.2d 701(1994)

25

Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329
(Utah 1993)
Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d
1069 (Utah 1991)

5, 6, 8-17, 22
17

Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991)
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 176 P.2d 896
(Utah 1989)

iii

17-18

7

State v. Carter, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(Jan. 18, 1995)

21

State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23
(March 29, 1994)

10

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343
(Utah 1990)
State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689
(Utah 1960)

4-6,

12
12-13

Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437 (1926)
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)
Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777 (Utah 1992)
U.S. v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129
(2d Cir. 1989)
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474
(Utah app. 1991)

4, 9, 10
13
4

25
7

RULES:
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

32, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994)
47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994) . . . .
51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994)
52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994)
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994)

23-25
3, 4, 6, 12-13
21-22
7
22

OTHER:
32 A.L.R. 3d 747

11

iv

Plaintiff

Shirley Carrier submits this Reply Brief in support of her

appeal.
POINT 1;
Ms. Carrier's Statement
reflects the facts presented at trial
the transcript.

of Facts properly
and contained in

In response to Ms. Carrier's statement of facts, Defendant

Pleasant

Grove alleges that counsel has been "inaccurate and misleading," and "taken
undue liberties by going beyond the actual testimony contained in the
transcript."

Defendant's Brief at 3-4.

However,

Pleasant Grove fails to

furnish even one example of counsel's purported inaccuracies.
Throughout her Statement of Facts, Ms. Carriers cites almost every
sentence to specific page and line numbers.
presented

the

facts

in

this

concerning their correctness.

manner

so

no

Counsel for Ms. Carrier
question

could

be

raised

Accordingly, Ms. Carrier simply responds to

Defendant's accusations by encouraging a review of the transcript.
Counsel for Ms. Carrier does not want a verbal "tug of war" with
Defendant Pleasant Grove over the facts.

Nevertheless, Ms. Carrier finds it

necessary to object to Pleasant Grove's Statement of the Facts as follows:
- Paragraph six, page five. Pleasant Grove states that "there existed a
substantial controversy between Smith and Pro-Tech." This is one of
the primary issues on appeal; This is a conclusion of the defendant
and not a fact.
- Paragraph eight, page six.
Pleasant Grove quotes a neighbor as
saying that the stop sign had been down "no more than a day or so."
Pleasant Grove's edited version of the quote emphasizes the shortness
of the period. The full quote, however, states: "My recollection would
be that it was not more than a day or so, possibly two, but I wouldn't
think that it would exceed that." (Transcript, Vol. III-R. 1486, lines 315)(emphasis added).

1

- Paragraph ten, page seven.
Pleasant Grove claims that city
employees "ideally" hoped that downed stop signs would be identified
within minutes or hours.
However, in none of paragraph ten's
citations to the record do city employees characterize this as an
"ideal." Rather than an ideal, city employees straightforwardly stated
that they expected downed stop signs to be identified within minutes
or hours. (Transcript, Vol. IV-R. 1855, lines 2-9; Vol. V-R. 1981, lines
22-25 to 1982, lines 1-4).
- Paragraph ten, page seven. Pleasant Grove states that there was no
evidence presented to the jury that the stop sign had been down "a
number of days."
Certainly not a fact, this statement constitutes
Pleasant Grove's opinion.
Therefore, a jury might find that the
neighbor's testimony of "possibly two" days, quoted above, means "a
number of days."
- Paragraph eleven, pages seven to eight. Pleasant Grove claims that
the Court was made aware that each defendant had an interest in
"shifting the ultimate responsibility for the accident on the other
parties involved."
None of the answers or legal memoranda
specifically claim another Defendant at fault.
The only party that
Defendants explicitly targeted for blame was Ms. Carrier.
- Paragraph fifteen, page nine.
Pleasant Grove asserts that Ms.
Carrier's counsel "emphasized the theme of conflict and disparate
interests" between the Defendants during the trial.
Furthermore,
Pleasant Grove claims that counsel pinpointed this conflict as the
"paramount issue" in the case.
In fact, Ms. Carrier's counsel did not use the terms "conflict" or
"disparate interests" on any of the cited pages. Rather than "disparate
interests," counsel emphasized a theme of dishonesty among the
Defendants which directly related to their credibility and their
attempt to shift fault to Ms. Carrier. (Transcript, Vol. XI-R. 2555-56).
Furthermore, counsel for Ms. Carrier did not refer to the conflict as
the "paramount issue" in the case, rather the transcript clearly shows
that he called truth the paramount issue. (Transcript, Vol. XI-R. 2555,
lines 5-11).
Facts

are those items found

characterization

and/or

opinion

in the record
about

2

what

and not any
happened

party's

during

the

proceedings.

To the extent that Defendant Pleasant Grove attempts to inject

opinion, conclusions of law, or to alter the facts to its own advantage, its
Statement must be rejected.
In addition to Pleasant Grove's Statement of the Facts,
William Roger Smith also offers
statements
liability.
Mr.

provided,

however,

a version of the facts.

concern

facts

relevant

to

Defendant

Most of the
Mr.

Smith's

Ms. Carrier does not appeal the jury assignment of 40% liability to

Smith.

Therefore,

while

Ms. Carrier

does

not

agree

statements contain the overall picture of the evidence, she

that

these

nonetheless

considers them irrelevant in this appeal.
POINT 2:
The Utah Court of Appeals reviews the trial
court's interpretation of Rule 47 and Sutton
using the
"correctness" standard.
Defendants

argue that the trial court made a factual

finding

in

awarding them three times as many peremptory challenges as those given
to Ms. Carrier.

Defendant Pleasant Grove's Brief at 1, 17-18; Defendant

Pro-Tech's Brief at 2; Defendant William Roger Smith's Brief at 17-19.
Therefore,

Defendants

erroneous."

Id.

A.

contend,

the

standard

of

review

is

"clearly

The trial court's decision was an interpretation of law.

Ms. Carrier asserts that even if the trial court examined the facts, in
deciding to step outside Rule 47(c) and allow Defendants extra peremptory
challenges it interpreted the law.

Most decisions interpreting a statute,

rule, ordinance, or even common law, arise in the context of

facts.

Therefore, in such cases, the court usually must fasten its interpretation on
factual

determinations.

Utah

case

law

specifically

recognizes

interpretation of law, in a factual setting, is a legal question.
3

that

the

For example, in State

v. Pena,

the Utah Supreme Court held that

whether a given set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question
of law.

869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).

See also, Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d

20, 22 (Utah 1990) (Whether a party has failed to comply with statutory
requirements

and

civil

procedure

rules,

dismissal, is a legal question); Trujillo

thereby

v. Jenkins,

meriting

involuntary

840 P.2d 777, 778-79

(Utah 1992)(citing common law, whether a landowner owes a duty of care
to another is a question of law).
Here, the trial court had to interpret Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 47(c) which requires multiple parties to join in a challenge.
deciding

whether

the

rule

compelled

Defendants

to

exercise

In
their

peremptory challenges jointly, the court also interpreted Utah common law.
The authoritative case before the trial court, Sutton

v. Otis, provides an

exception to Rule 47(c)'s mandate when a "substantial controversy" exists
between the parties.

68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437 (1926).

exception to Rule 47(c) apply here?
What is a substantial controversy?
could not make the decision.

Does the

What did the Sutton

Court

Sutton
intend?

These are not factual questions; a jury

Because the court based its determination on

an interpretation of Utah law, the Utah Court of Appeals does not give
deference to the trial court's decision.
B.

The trial court had limited discretion.

Ms. Carrier maintains that the trial court interpreted the law and
therefore the standard of review is correctness.

However, even if the Utah

Court of Appeals rejects this approach, the trial court's decision would still
not be a question of fact.
Pena,

As the Utah Supreme Court observed in State v.

some questions are neither purely law nor purely fact, rather they

fall into a third category—the application of law to fact.
4

869 P.2d 932, 936

(Utah 1994).
In this category, the Court recognizes that the "effect of a given set of
facts is a question of law. . . ." Id.

However, once the appellate court has so

classified the issue, it still must determine how much discretion the trial
court may use in making the decision.

Id. at 937.

According to Pena,

the

amount of discretion granted ranges along a spectrum, and the "closeness of
appellate review of the application of law to fact actually runs the entire
length of this spectrum."

Id. at 938.

The more limited a court's discretion,

the closer the appellate review approaches de novo.
The Utah Supreme Court in Pen a
trial judges discretion
factors:

and deferential

Id.

examined the reasons for granting
review.

The Court listed

three

1) the facts underlying the legal rule are "so complex and varying"

that no rule can be formulated which adequately address[es] the relevance
of all these facts;

2) the situation is new; therefore the appellate judges

cannot

or

anticipate

articulate

what

factors

should

be

"outcome

determinative"; and 3) the trial court has observed facts which cannot be
adequately reflected in the record.

Id. at 939.

In this case, the trial court's decision does not fall within any of the
three factors in Pena.

First, the facts underlying a substantial controversy

are not complex and varying.
Court specified
challenges.
scenarios

those factors which do not merit additional

862 P.2d 1329, 1332-33 (Utah 1993).
that

arise

separate

counsel,

different

facts,

claims.

Thus, in Randle v. Allen, the Utah Supreme

between

multi-party

uncooperativeness,

different

separate

shifting,

legal theories, hostility,

In fact, the Randle

That list covers most

litigants:

liability

peremptory

answers,

different

and derivative

claims,
cross-

Court lists only one fact that constitutes a

substantial controversy—a nonderivative cross-claim.
5

This is not a complex

and varying category.
Second, the award of additional peremptory challenges is not so new
that

appellate

outcome

courts

will have

determinative

difficulty

factors.

The

anticipating

first

case

discussing

peremptory challenges was Sutton v. Otis, decided in 1926.
P. 437 (1926).
Court listed
preceding

Moreover, in the most recent case, Randle,
the outcome determinative

factors,

or

articulating
additional

68 Utah 85, 249
the Utah Supreme

those discussed

in

the

paragraph.

Third, in this case the record accurately reflects the judge's first hand
experience with the facts.

The court said that it made the decision based

upon "the nature of the case." It did not rely on witnesses' appearances and
demeanors.
Beyond the factors listed in Pena,

the Randle

decision

drastically

limits a court's discretion to award additional peremptory challenges.

While

other jurisdictions allow the trial court to adjust the number of challenges
on each side, the Randle

Court emphasized that it did "not find that degree

of discretion built into subsection (c) of Rule 47."
(Utah 1993).

862 P.2d 1329, 1333

The Court again stressed the lack of discretionary language in

the rule when setting forth the "substantial controversy" standard.

Id.

Finally, the Court warned that "a trial judge must carefully appraise the
degree

of

adverseness
other."

adverseness

among

truly

warrants

both

Pena

co-parties

giving

that

and

side

determine

more

whether

challenges

that

than

the

Id.

Under
discretion

to grant

extra

and Randle,
peremptory

correctness standard cannot be applied,

the trial court had only
challenges. Therefore,

even

limited
if

the Utah Court of Appeals should

review the trial court's decision under a less deferential, de novo standard.
6

a

C.

The trial court failed to give a factual basis for its decision.

Finally, because the trial court refused to any give the factual basis
for its decision to grant Defendants extra challenges, appellate review will
be difficult.

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the

court to find

the facts

specially.

Ms. Carrier acknowledges

that this

mandate does not extend to a motion to limit the number of peremptory
challenges.

Nonetheless, this case illustrates the problems that arise when

the court fails to give any sort of specifics for its decision.
In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989),
the Utah Supreme Court cautioned that findings must be articulated with
sufficient detail so that the reviewing court can understand the basis of the
ruling.
App.

See also, Woodward v.
1991)

(without

Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 and 478 n.7 (Utah

adequate

factual

findings

meaningful

review

is

virtually impossible, thus placing appellate courts in awkward position of
speculating what the trial court actually determined the facts to be).
Here, counsel for Ms. Carrier asked the court for the grounds on which
it made its decision.

Mr. Harris explained, "Somewhere along the lines if

there's going to be grounds for having equal preemptories [sic] each, I at
least ought to have the opportunity of knowing exactly what it is that
makes them so disparate in their claim. . . ."
page 1, lines 23-25 to page 2, lines 1-2.

Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 2,

Furthermore, Mr. Harris petitioned

the court to give the grounds for its decision, "for the record. . . ."

Id. at

page 2, line 5.
The court responded by saying that "I don't think we need that."
line 10.

Id.

As to the basis for its ruling, "Counsel, I feel that they are disparate

enough, just by the nature of the case, to permit it."
7

Id. lines 8-10.

Without

any facts listed in the court's decision, indeed the court's refusal to place
these facts in the record, meaningful review, no matter what the standard,
will be extremely difficult.

Cf., Aha Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,

1288 (Utah 1993) (When the trial court errs in interpreting a statute, the
factual findings are often inadequate in light of the incorrect interpretation.
Accordingly the case must be remanded for adequate findings.).
POINT 3:
Defendants fail to meet the
defined in Randle
v. Allen
requiring an
cross-claim,

standard as
independent

Ms. Carrier argued in her opening brief that Randle

v. Allen

"substantial controversy" as requiring a nonderivative cross-claim.
Appellant at 15.

defines
Brief of

She basis this assertion on the clear language in

Randle:

"[A] 'substantial controversy' exists when a party on one side of a lawsuit
has a cross-claim against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a separate,
distinct

lawsuit

defendants."

from

the

action

862 P.2d at 1333.

existing

between

the

plaintiffs

and

Defendants' attempts to ignore or minimize

this language fail.
A. Randle
considered factors other than independent
claims but found them inadequate.
Defendant Smith argues that the Randle
challenges

to

one

defendant

not

because

cross-

Court allowed
an

independent

additional
cross-claim

existed, but rather because he had a different theory of recovery.
Brief at 22. Randle,

however, explicitly rejects this approach.

Smith's

It observed

that some courts have granted additional peremptories because a co-party
had a different legal theory.

862 P.2d at 1333, citing Distad v. Cubin, 633

P.2d 167, 171 (Wyo. 1981).

The Court then warns:

"We do not find that

degree of discretion built into subsection (c) of Rule 47."
8

Id.

In a similar argument, Defendant Pleasant Grove and Defendant ProTech claim that Randle

focused on the cross-claim because no other factors

evidencing a substantial controversy existed.
20; Pro-Tech's Brief at 28. The Randle

Pleasant Grove's Brief at 19-

Court, however, listed possible other

factors and proclaimed that these simply do not meet the high standard
necessary

for

additional peremptory

challenges.

These factors

inadequate include separate answers, separate counsel,
liability

shifting,

different

defenses,

different

claims,

uncooperativeness,
different

different legal theories, hostility, and derivative cross-claims.
1332-33.

deemed

facts,

862 P.2d at

Pleasant Grove offers no example of other factors that would fall

outside these categories.

Indeed, the examples that Defendants give in this

case have already been rejected by Randle,

as discussed below in Point 4.

B. The Randle
decision requiring nonderivative
strengthens and clarifies Sutton v. Otis.

cross-claims

Defendant Pro-Tech argues that in requiring an independent crossclaim, Randle

"cuts against the reasoning of the court in Sutton.

would require Sutton's
claims that the Sutton

reversal.

Pro-Tech's Brief at 16, 29.

. . ." and

Pro-Tech also

court advocated a "more liberal interpretation of the

statute" to avoid injustices.

Id.

An examination of Sutton

shows, however, that Randle

depart from either its holding or analysis.

does not

Thus, for example, Randle

f

s

reliance on an independent cross-claim arises directly out of the language
and facts in Sutton.

The Sutton

Court noted that one defendant had enough

evidence to bring a separate and distinct lawsuit.

249 P. at 454.

Moreover,

that defendant had indeed filed a separate suit on the same subject matter
against its co-party in federal court.
characterized the issue as:

Id.

at 455.

In Sutton

the court

"Were [the co-parties] both on the same side
9

within the meaning of the statute?"

Id. at 458.

In Randle,

the Utah

Supreme Court merely requires the co-parties to demonstrate that they are
not on the same side.
Sutton's
separate

plea for "a more liberal interpretation" directly refers to a

opinion

in

which

Justice

additional peremptory challenges.
and

providing

for

additional

Cherry

249 P. at 457.
challenges,

advocated

never

granting

In rejecting this approach

Sutton

emphasizes

that

the

standard is high and only rarely should courts grant more peremptories.
Id. at 458.
Finally, Utah courts, are governed by the principle of stare decisis.
enunciated

in

State

v.

Menzies,

this means that lower

precedents set within their jurisdiction.
29, 1994).

courts

As

follow

235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (March

A court may depart only if "clearly convinced that it was

originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions
and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent." Id.
Here, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled twice on the issue of peremptory
challenges, once in 1926 and again in 1993.

The latter case clearly provides

the most convincing precedent. 1
C. Randle's
requirement of nonderivative cross-claims
the best balance.
Defendant

Pro-Tech

contends that it is unfair

strikes

to deny

additional

peremptory challenges except when a co-party has filed an independent
cross-claim.

Pro-Tech's Brief at 23-27.

It argues that the requirement

1 Pro-Tech also argues that surrounding jurisdictions provide a better rule of law.
This argument, whether true or not, misses the same fundamental principle of
jurisprudence.
When a state court of highest jurisdiction speaks, the lower state
courts follow that precedent. State v. Menzies., 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (March 29,
1994).

10

encourages litigation and would allow hostile co-parties to be deprived of
even one challenge.

Id. at 23.

Since joint tort-feasors can no longer seek

contribution, Pro-Tech claims that most defendants have little incentive to
file cross-claims.

Id.

at 27. 2

The Utah Supreme Court specifically recognized the fairness issue in
Randle.

There it stated, "While there may be some unfairness in requiring

hostile co-parties to join in making their peremptory challenges, granting
co-parties on one side of a lawsuit additional challenges places the opposing
side at a disadvantage. . . ."

862 P.2d at 1333.

The Court, aware of the

disadvantages to both sides, determined that the greater unfairness lies in
granting additional challenges when no substantial controversy exists. 3
Pro-Tech's concern with all types of cross-claims illustrates that it has
not understood the language in Randle.

There, the Court stressed that the

cross-claim must be "in effect, a separate, distinct lawsuit. . . ."
1333.

862 P.2d at

It specifically rejected the type of cross-claim Pro-Tech describes in

2

Pro-Tech claims that employers cannot file cross-claims against employees acting
within the course of employment. Pro-Tech's Brief at 23.
The argument contains no
cite to either case law or statutory authority.
3 Defendant Pro-Tech cites to International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Smith, 269 S.W.
886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) and 32 A.L.R. 3d 747 for support. The International case,
rather than illustrating Pro-Tech's position, actually demonstrates the unfairness in
allowing co-parties who do not file independent cross-claims to obtain additional
peremptories.
In that case, a railway company impleaded two employees and sought
thereby to obtain additional challenges. The court rejected this attempt noting that to
do otherwise would allow a party to multiply its peremptory
challenges.
Similarly, Pro-Tech's reliance on A.L.R. author Donald E. Evins and Mourison v.
Hansen is misplaced. In fact, Mr. Evins criticizes the Mourison
decision to grant
additional peremptories.
He states that the court reached its conclusion "regardless of
the fact that the term 'party' in such statutes so frequently has been construed to
mean all on one side of an action. . . ." 32 A.L.R. 3d at 767. Mr. Evins describes the
traditional view as holding that the "plurality of litigants on a side does not increase
the number of peremptory challenges except where their interests are positively
made to appear diverse or antagonistic."
Id.
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its argument on employers and contribution:

"When, however, a cross-

claim is merely a derivative of the original action, such as a cross-claim for
indemnification

or contribution,

a 'substantial controversy' does not exist

for the purposes of Rule 47." Id.

(emphasis added).

D. Rule 47fc) and Randle's
constitutional provisions.
In Greenwood

interpretations do not violate any

v. City of North Salt Lake,

the Utah Supreme Court

noted that "legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. . . ."
817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991).

It further warned, "those who challenge a

statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating
its unconstitutionality."
Court has cautioned, "A
when

possible,

Id.

Moreover, concerning issues on appeal, the

fundamental principle of judicial review is that,

[courts] refrain

from

deciding

constitutional

questions."

State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990)
In this case, Defendant Pro-Tech raises several constitutional attacks
on Rule 47(c) and its exception embodied in Randle v. Allen.
charges,

however,

Pro-Tech

generally

neglects

to

Therefore, it fails to meet the heavy burden called for in

cite

In making this
any

authority.

Greenwood.

Even considering Pro-Tech's arguments, they lack merit.

For example,

Pro-Tech claims that a strict interpretation of Rule 47(c) and Randle

violates

equal

of

protection

guaranteed

under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

the

United States Constitution and Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
However, in 1960, the Utah Supreme Court rejected an equal protection
challenge
jointly.

to

the requirement

State v. Rivenburgh,

While Rivenburgh

that

peremptory

challenges

be

exercised

11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689, 697 (Utah 1960).

concerns peremptory challenges in the criminal context,

the Court specifically noted that "where the matter of equal protection of
12

the laws is involved, there is no essential difference
criminal rights."

between civil and

Id.

Pro-Tech also argues a violation of the privileges and immunities
clause

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

jurisdictions have more lenient rules.
to Pro-Tech's
guarantee

the

fact

that

Pro-Tech's Brief at 18-19.

of

Utah

the

same

other

Contrary

state

rights

as

those

in

not
other

Rather it insures that those venturing into Utah from another

state will have the same rights as Utahans.
395 (1948).

on

assertion, the privileges and immunities clause does

citizens

jurisdictions.

based

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,

Utah laws do not need to conform to another state's idea of

justice.
Finally, Pro-Tech contends that a strict interpretation of Rule 47(c)
and Ran die violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

Pro-Tech's Brief at 19-20.

Due process demands

only that the questioned law is not "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,
and that means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object."

Nebbia v. People of State of New York, N.Y., 291 U.S. 502, 525

(1934).

In this case, Pro-Tech claims that the requiring a co-party to share

peremptory challenges "limits the effectiveness

of counsel."

As

Nebbia

makes clear, "The Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege
to engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases."
Because

Pro-Tech

has

not

met

its

constitutionality of Rule 47(c) and the Randle
rejected.

burden

Id. at 527-28.
in

challenging

the

exception, its attack must be

Moreover, even a superficial analysis of Pro-Tech's claims shows

that they are without merit.
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Point 4:
controversy

Defendants fail
between them.

to

establish

a

Even if one accepts the argument that Randle

substantial
v. Allen

does not

require the filing of an independent cross-claim, Defendants still fail to
show

that

a

substantial

controversy

existed.

The

facts

offered

by

Defendants invariably fall into one of the categories deemed inadequate by
Randle.

For example:

1.

Liability shifting:

All of the Defendants argued that each had an

interest in shifting the blame to another and that there had been "finger
pointing."

Smith's Brief at 22-25, Pro-Tech's Brief at 33, Pleasant Grove's

Brief at 26.

Defendants supported this claim in particular by emphasizing

the controversy between Smith and Pro-Tech.
However, Randle

states that a substantial controversy does not exist

simply because co-parties attempt to shift liability to the other.

862 P.2d at

1332.
2.

Separate

answers,

separate

counsel,

separate

preparations:

Defendants each point out that separate counsel was necessary and that all
of them filed separate answers with separate preparations.

Smith's Brief at

23-24, Pro-Tech's Brief at 32-33, Pleasant Grove's Brief at 23-24.
As the Randle

Court emphasized:

"Sutton

expressly held, however,

that these factors by themselves do not establish the existence of adverse
interests for purpose of the rule."
3.

Different theories of negligence, different defenses, different claims

resting on different
different
defenses.

862 P.2d at 1332.

facts.

Defendants argue that the complaint

theories of negligence requiring Defendants to prepare

alleged
different

Smith's Brief at 21, Pro-Tech's Brief at 34, Pleasant Grove's Brief

at 24.
In rejecting these factors, the Randle
14

Court noted, "That approach,

however, would entitle co-defendants to extra peremptory challenges in a
majority

of

multiple-defendant

disadvantage on plaintiffs."
4.

cases,

thereby

imposing

a

significant

862 P.2d at 1333.

Failure to cooperate and hostility.

Defendants primarily rely on

the fact that Defendant Smith claimed that Defendant Pro-Tech asked him
to lie about the accident.

Defendant

Pro-Tech denied this

accusation.

Smith's Brief at 23-25, Pro-Tech's Brief at 32-33, Pleasant Grove's Brief at
25.
Randle

rejected this type of squabbling as inadequate.

noted that Sutton
controversy.

The Court

held that uncooperativeness did not create a substantial

862 P.2d at 1332.

Moreover, in acknowledging that some

unfairness may result, the Court nonetheless requires hostile co-parties to
join in making their peremptory challenges.

Id. at 1333.

In addition to the factors listed above, Defendants make much of the
fact that counsel for Ms. Carrier acknowledged Pleasant Grove's interests as
"disparate."
Brief at 21.

Smith's Brief at 19-21, Pro-Tech's Brief at 34, Pleasant Grove's
Counsel's "concession," however, is insignificant

for

the

following reasons.
First, as Randle
matter.

emphasizes, it is not the party's characterizations that

Rather, the "trial judge must carefully

adverseness

among co-parties.

appraise the degree of

862 P.2d at 1333.

interests" is not the proper standard.

Under both Randle

Second,

"disparate

and Sutton,

parties must be involved in a "substantial controversy."

the co-

Third, although

counsel did verbally state that Pleasant Grove had disparate interests, at no
time in the accompanying motion and legal memorandum did Ms. Carrier
suggest

or

peremptories.

agree

that

Pleasant

Grove

was

entitled

Fourth, the legal standard in Randle,
15

to

additional

the filing of an

independent cross-claim, had not been announced.
aware of Randle,

Since counsel became

he has never backed away from insisting that Pleasant

Grove did not merit additional challenges; it had not filed an independent
cross-claim.
Finally,

Defendant

Pleasant

Grove

"conflict" during the trial proceedings. 4
These

examples,

controversy.

however,

The

trial

are

court

provides

examples

of

Pleasant Grove's Brief at 24-25.

irrelevant

to

made

decision

peremptory challenges before trial began.

some

its

the

issue
to

of
grant

substantial
additional

Accordingly, the Utah Court of

Appeals should only consider the evidence before the trial judge at that
time. See King v. Special Resource Management,

Inc., 256 Mont. 367, 374,

846 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1993) (In deciding whether co-defendants are truly
adverse, court reviews only materials available at point of which ruling was
made and examines that information only as it was available to the trial
court before its ruling).

Point 5:

Ms, Carrier need not show actual prejudice.

Defendant Smith argues that even if the trial court erred in granting
Defendants
manipulated

additional challenges, Ms. Carrier must show that this error
or controlled the outcome.

language and reasoning in

Smith's

argument ignores

the

Randle.

4 Ms. Carrier objects to much of Defendant Pleasant Grove's characterizations in these
examples. For example, Pleasant Grove repeatedly harps on the "fact" that counsel for
Ms. Carrier emphasized a theme of "conflict" calling it the "paramount issue."
In fact, counsel for Ms. Carrier emphasized a theme of dishonesty among
Defendants.
The lies, accusations, and blame shifting relate more to honesty and
credibility than they do to conflict.
Moreover, the transcript clearly states that
counsel called truth the paramount issue in the case. Transcript Vol. XI-R. 2555, lines
5-11.
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As Randle

emphasized, showing prejudice would require Ms. Carrier

to "'discover the unknowable and to reconstruct what might have been and
never was. . . .'"
(Colo. 1985).

862 P.2d at 1334, citing Blade v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317, 322

The Court termed this as "impossible."

862 P.2d at 1334.

Accordingly, the Court held that the granting of additional

peremptory

challenges, especially when there is a significant disparity in the number, as
in this case, is prejudicial error.
Point

6:

substantial

The

Id.

jury's

verdict

is

not

supported

by

evidence.

Defendant Pleasant Grove first challenges Ms. Carrier's statement that
city employees testified that the City had failed.
27.

Pleasant Grove's Brief at

On this issue, Ms. Carrier cited to testimony by both Public Works

Director Frank Mills and Chief of Police Michael Ferre.
23.

Appellant's Brief at

In Mr. Mills case, he was asked whether he would agree that if the

downed stop sign had been missing for a number of days, the
surveillance system would have failed.
answered that way in my deposition."
21.

Mr. Mills responded:

City's

"Yes.

I

Transcript Vol. V-R. 1981, lines 17-

Chief Ferre similarly testified that a downed sign for a number of day

would mean that the City's system had been "ineffective."

Transcript Vol.

IV-R. 1855, lines 16-19.
Second,
statement

Defendant

Pleasant

Grove

of the standard of review.

quarrels

Pleasant

with

Ms.

Carrier's

Grove denies that

the

standard is "substantial evidence," ignoring the cases cited in Ms. Carrier's
brief and insisting that the standard be "competent evidence" citing Rees v.
Intermountain

Health

decided after Rees,

Care

Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).

In a case

the Utah Supreme Court characterized the standard as

requiring substantial and competent evidence.
17

Reeves v. Gentile,

813 P.2d

I l l , 115 (Utah 1991).

In any case, Ms. Carrier asserts that the jury verdict

does not meet the standard.

A.

Ms. Carrier correctly marshaled the relevant evidence.

Next, Defendant

Pleasant Grove claims that Ms. Carrier failed

marshal all of the evidence.

to

Pleasant Grove then proceeds to list several

pages of "evidence" in support of the verdict finding it 0% negligent.

As a

whole, this list has three problems.
First, many of the facts listed by Pleasant Grove are already contained
in Ms. Carrier's marshaling of the facts.

For example, indented paragraphs

5, 18, 29, 39, 41, 43, and 44, all appear in Ms. Carrier's Brief.

Moreover,

while some of Pleasant Grove's statements add more detail, the basic fact is
contained in Ms. Carrier's statements.

See indented paragraphs 19 and 42.

Specifically, Pleasant Grove's statements on how the streets being plowed
are basically embraced by Ms. Carrier's statement #3—on days with heavy
snowstorms, not all streets would be plowed, etc.
8, 22, 24, 25, and 32.

See

indented paragraphs

Concerning paragraph 45, although Ms. Carrier did

not list it in her section on marshaling, it is contained in the argument
section.

Ms. Carrier's Brief at 23.

Second,

some

of

the

facts

are

irrelevant

subsequent measures taken by Pleasant Grove.
1, stating that Officer

because

they

concern

Thus, indented paragraph

Shepherd contacted city workers immediately

after

the accident and that those workers responded quickly has nothing to do
with allowing the stop sign to go unreplaced for 1-2 days.

Likewise with

paragraphs 15 and 40.
Third, most of the Defendants' statements do not support the verdict
and therefore are not relevant.

Testimony, for example, detailing Pleasant
18

Grove's duty to watch for downed signs meets one of the prima
elements of Ms. Carrier's case; it does not support a finding
negligence.

See indented paragraphs 2, 13, 14, and 21.

facie

of 0%

Similarly, the City's

testimony on its standard of care is also an element of Ms. Carrier's case.
See indented paragraph 16, 34, 35,

and 38.

Moreover, evidence that a witness does not recall or does not know
something supports neither Pleasant Grove nor Ms. Carrier.
paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 17, 23, 27, and 30.

See

indented

Testimony about the size of

the patrol force or the snow removal crew is not relevant since the City
never relied on this as a defense.

See indented paragraphs 12, and 37.

In

addition, because Ms. Carrier did not claim negligence based on a city
employee knocking over the stop sign, that testimony is also irrelevant.

See

indented paragraphs 28, and 31.
Pleasant Grove lists as a fact Mr. Holdaway's statement that his
present memory was vague.

See indented paragraph 8.

Ms. Carrier did not

include this because the relevant testimony, used by both parties, on the
time period for the missing stop sign came from Mr. Holdaway's deposition.
In the deposition, Mr. Holdaway stated "My recollection would be that it
was not more than a day or so, possibly two, but I wouldn't think that it
would exceed that."

(Transcript, Vol. III-R. I486, lines 3-15).

Rather than

supporting the verdict, as Pleasant Grove asserts in paragraph

10, this

information tends to point out the City's failure.
Finally, Pleasant Grove lists the jury verdict, and the fact that it was
unanimous, as evidence.

See indented paragraph 47.

This, of course, is not

a fact before the trial jury and has no place in marshaling the evidence.

19

B.
The clear weight of the evidence contradicting the jury's
verdict, is not based on assumptions.
Defendant Pleasant Grove maintains that in order to find the City
negligent, the jury had to make two assumptions.

Furthermore, Pleasant

Grove contends that the jury's refusal to make these assumptions justifies
its verdict.

Defendant's argument ignores the facts.

First, Pleasant Grove claims that Ms. Carrier wanted the jury
assume that the stop sign had been down more

than one or two days.

to
Not

surprisingly, Pleasant Grove offers no cite to the record or Ms. Carrier's
brief for this claim.

In fact, at trial Ms. Carrier merely claimed that the stop

sign had been down for one to two days, as evidenced by her witness's
testimony:

"My recollection would be that it was not more than a day or so,

possibly two, but I wouldn't think that it would exceed that."
Vol. III-R. 1486, lines 3-15).
has never asserted otherwise.

(Transcript,

Moreover, throughout the appeal Ms. Carrier
See Ms. Carrier's Brief at 7, 12, 22.

Second, Pleasant Grove claims that the jury would have to assume
that City employees actually went through the intersection between

the

time the stop sign was knocked down and when the accident occurred.
Pleasant Grove's Brief at 39.

Pleasant Grove Street Superintendent testified,

however, that upon arriving at the accident scene, he noted that both 1100
North and 500 East had been plowed.

Accordingly, making no assumptions

at all, some city employee had been through that intersection and plowed
the roads.

On the other hand, for Pleasant Grove to assert that after a

heavy snowstorm, no employee plowed 1100 North, a busy collector road,
would be incredible.
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Point 7:
Ms,
way issue.

Carrier

properly

presented

the

right

of

As a preliminary matter, Defendant Pro-Tech argues that Ms. Carrier
has failed in presenting her right of way argument because she did not
"provide the court with the testimony supportive of the instruction and the
verdict."

Pro-Tech's Brief at 37.

It is unclear to what Pro-Tech refers.

However,

to the extent that Pro-Tech

suggests

that Ms. Carrier

must

marshal evidence before attacking the jury instruction, Pro-Tech is in error.
As State v. Carter declares, "Whether a trial court correctly refused to
give a particular jury instruction is a question of law."
3, 17 (Jan. 18, 1995), cited by Pro-Tech at 37.

256 Utah Adv. Rep.
Questions of law are

reviewed for correctness and no deference is given to the trial court.
InVl

(U.S.A.),

Inc.,

v. 11th Ave.

Ong

Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).

Therefore, there is no need to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's
ruling.
In substantively attacking Ms. Carrier's argument on the right of way
instruction, Defendants argue that each party is allowed to have its theory
of the case before the jury.
opening Brief.
object

to

instructions.

Ms. Carrier supports this principle in her

Ms. Carrier's Brief at 24.

Defendants'

attempts

In addition, Ms. Carrier did not

to present

their

theories

in

the

jury

Rather, Ms. Carrier simply requested the Court to present her

theory unhampered by the alternate theory upon which Defendants relied.
Defendant Pleasant Grove contends, however, that Ms. Carrier was not
entitled

to

have

controverted fact.

her

theory

before

the jury

Pleasant Grove's Brief at 40.

because

it

contained

This position finds no

support in Utah law, moreover it logically does not make sense.
province of the jury to decide issues of fact.

a

It is the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rule 51 (1994) (The jurors "are the exclusive judges of all questions of
21

fact.").

Therefore, under Pleasant Grove's argument, no party could get its

theory to the jury because both claims and defenses rest upon controverted
facts.

If the case did not have controverted facts, it would be ripe for

summary

judgment.

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure,

Rule

56(c)

(1994)(Judgment to be given if "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
Finally, Defendant Pleasant Grove argues that Ms. Carrier did not
establish

that confusion

Grove's Brief at 43.

resulted from

Pleasant

Under Utah law, however, Ms. Carrier need only show

that the jury instruction "tends
complaining party."

the court's instruction.

Davidson

1991)(emphasis added).

to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
v. Princey 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App.

Ms. Carrier demonstrated this tendency on pages

26-27 of the opening brief.

As emphasized there, in combining

both

Defendants' and Ms. Carrier's proposed instructions the court did not allow
for the fact that 1)

one stop sign was up and the other down at the

intersection, 2) Ms. Carrier's state of mind, or 3) that for more than twenty
years traffic on 1100 North had the right-of-way due to the existence of
two signs.

From Mr. Smith's perspective, the intersection may have been

unregulated; to Ms. Carrier it was regulated, hence the confusion in the jury
instruction.
Point 8:
improper

The trial court allowed Defendants to
use of a rebuttal, impeachment witness.

make

Defendants argue that the trial court properly allowed Mr. Knight to
take the stand and to testify outside the scope of direct examination.
argument ignores, however, the role of rebuttal evidence.
Allen,

In Randle

This
v.

the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[r]ebuttal evidence is evidence

tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify
22

the

effect of the opponent's evidence."

862 P.2d at 1338.

In this case, Ms. Carrier wanted to use Mr. Knight's
testimony

to

impeach

the

defendant

Pleasant

Grove's

position

reconstruction issues, and generally on the issue of credibility.
for

Ms. Carrier

reconstructionist

emphasized
specialist

to the jury,

"Mr.

who was designated

Knight

on

As counsel

is an

accident

by Defendant,

Pleasant

Grove City, in this case as their expert on reconstruction."
R. 2439, line 22 to 2440, line 4 (emphasis

deposition

added).

Transcript Vol. XPleasant

Grove

announced to the jury at the beginning of trial that it would call Mr. Knight
as an expert witness.

Not surprisingly,

despite this representation,

it

deliberately chose not to call Mr. Knight, who agreed with Ms. Carrier's
expert on many important issues.

Instead Pleasant Grove chose to rely on

Dr. Blotter's reconstruction testimony presented by Pro-Tech which differed
from Ms. Carrier's expert and Mr. Knight.
Contrary to Defendants' allegations, Ms. Carrier did not choose to call
Mr. Knight as a witness.

Rather, pursuant to Rule 32, Ms. Carrier informed

the court that she only intended to use limited portions of the deposition for
impeachment purposes.

The court allowed Mr. Knight to take the stand,

over Ms. Carrier's objection and upon Defendant Pro-Tech's insistence that
he be present in person.
It is Ms. Carrier's position that Mr. Knight never should have been
allowed to take the stand.

Pleasant Grove had waived their right to call Mr.

Knight and elicit testimony on any and all issues in his deposition.
Grove rested its case without calling Mr. Knight.

Pleasant

Rule 32 explicitly provides

that a deposition may be used for any purpose at trial.
Here Ms. Carrier's stated intention was to simply read portions of the
deposition without Mr. Knight appearing, as provided by the Rule.
23

The most

Defendants

can argue is that they would be allowed to read

portions of the deposition, under Rule 32, to the jury.

additional

Rule 32 does not

provide that the witness must be present in court for any of Defendants'
stated reasons of context, foundation, or background.

The court clearly

abused its discretion in granting Pro-Tech's demand that Mr. Knight be
present.
Despite Mr. Knight's presence on the stand, counsel for Ms. Carrier
held to his original stated Rule 32 presentation of the witness deposition
testimony.

Thus, in beginning examination, counsel for Ms. Carrier stated

"This will be the easiest examination you've ever had in your life, Mr.
Knight.

I'm going to get four or five yes's [sic] out of you, so just sit back

and relax. . . . And basically I'm going to read along, and ask you if what
I've read is correct, and then we'll move on to the next."

Transcript Vol. X-

R. 2440, lines 9-19. During this period, generally, the only time counsel
stopped reading from the deposition was to mark exhibits and respond
briefly to topics raised in Defendants' voir dire questioning, permitted by
the court.
After allowing Mr. Knight to take the stand, the court compounded
its error by: 1) allowing any cross-examination outside reading additional
portions of the deposition text (Rule 32);

and 2) thereafter by allowing

cross-examination on new topics not raised in the depositions portions read
by counsel for Ms. Carrier.

Defendant Pleasant Grove contends that cross-

examination outside the scope of this rebuttal was permissible since it
covered material offered elsewhere in Mr. Knight's deposition.
Grove's Brief at 46.

Pleasant

Defendant Smith claims that cross examination can be

employed to take information gained in rebuttal and use it to establish
different facts.

Smith's Brief at 36-37.
24

Defendant Pro-Tech argues that

examination beyond the scope of rebuttal to add "foundation and context."
Pro-Tech's Brief at 42.
All of these arguments, however,

step outside the proper

rebuttal evidence and the use of a deposition under Rule 32.

role of
Rebuttal

testimony, by its nature, must be limited to impeaching the matters at issue.
People

v.

Brooks,

621 N.Y.S.2d

701, 704 (1994).

Therefore,

examination should not be allowed to go beyond the direct impeachment.
V. Koskerides,

crossU.S.

877 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (2d Cir. 1989).

In this instance, Defendants raised an entirely new issue, i.e. which
party had the right-of-way.

It is undisputed that the right-of-way issue was

not mentioned anywhere in the depositions portions read to the jury.

The

court's ruling allowed Defendants to raise this issue for the first time in trial,
during Ms. Carrier's impeachment testimony.

They had previously chosen not

to call Mr. Knight or to put on evidence of this issue, thereby waiving the
right to bring it before the jury.
Finally, Ms. Carrier's counsel attempted to deal with the court's errors
by

examination

examination."

of

Mr.

Knight

following

Pro-Tech's

improper

"cross-

Therefore, although Defendant Pro-Tech introduced the right-

of-way issue, Ms. Carrier's counsel had no choice but to engage in damage
control at that point.

The court's rulings allowed "the horse out of the barn."
CONCLUSION

Based upon the arguments the opening Brief and those found in this
response, together with the evidence on record, Ms. Carrier

respectfully

requests the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse and remand this case.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 1995.
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